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Driving at Stable

09.23.21 // Medicine, Miscellany

A classic Jeff Bezos quotation:

I very frequently get the question: “What’s going to change in the next 10 years?” That’s a very interesting question.

I almost never get the question: “What’s not going to change in the next 10 years?” And I submit to you that that second question is actually the more important of the two.

You can build a business strategy around the things that are stable in time. In our retail business, we know that customers want low prices, and I know that’s going to be true 10 years from now. They want fast delivery; they want vast selection. It’s impossible to imagine a future 10 years from now where a customer comes up and says, “Jeff I love Amazon, I just wish the prices were a little higher.” Or, “I love Amazon, I just wish you’d deliver a little slower.” Impossible.

So we know the energy we put into these things today will still be paying off dividends for our customers 10 years from now. When you have something that you know is true, even over the long term, you can afford to put a lot of energy into it.”

I recently attended a “leadership” seminar about (radiology) healthcare ecosystems and change. As with all virtual events since early 2020, discussion of the Covid-19 pandemic played an outsized role, and the nature of complexity and change were much pontificated about.

But no one over the course of two days—no one—mentioned the stability of the core mission. The strategic analyses—such as explicit or implicit utilization of SWOT—were happy to focus on anticipation and interception of perceived changes and threats, but no one spared a breath for what they thought wouldn’t change. We talked about trends in corporatization and productivity metrics, group consolidation, encroachment by midlevels and other specialties, downward reimbursement pressure, the push for 24/7 subspecialty staff coverage, lifestyle and burnout, and AI and data science.

To be sure, these and all other big changes are important, but you also can’t lose sight of the underlying purpose of the business in all the pivoting.

What can we say about medicine that is not going to change in 10 years? What is our stability north star?

(Yes this is a rhetorical question cop-out.)

 

The Availability Heuristic in Practice

08.16.21 // Medicine

We all use mental models (heuristics, rules of thumb) across a host of simple and complex problems. They often work; they sometimes don’t. You shouldn’t (and can’t) avoid having and using them, but you should be aware of them (and their limitations).

“The Influence of the Availability Heuristic on Physicians in the Emergency Department” is a cute little paper demonstrating recency bias in real-life practice:

Heuristics, or rules of thumb, are hypothesized to influence the care physicians deliver. One such heuristic is the availability heuristic, under which assessments of an event’s likelihood are affected by how easily the event comes to mind. We examined whether the availability heuristic influences physician testing in a common, high-risk clinical scenario: assessing patients with shortness of breath for the risk of pulmonary embolism.

…

The sample included 7,370 emergency physicians who had 416,720 patient visits for shortness of breath. The mean rate of pulmonary embolism testing was 9.0%. For physicians who had a recent patient visit with a pulmonary embolism diagnosis, their rate of pulmonary embolism testing for subsequent patients increased by 1.4 percentage points (95% confidence interval 0.42 to 2.34) in the 10 days after, which is approximately 15% relative to the mean rate of pulmonary embolism testing. We failed to find statistically significant changes in rates of pulmonary embolism testing in the subsequent 50 days following these first 10 days.

Of course, one of the biggest components of the availability heuristic in real life isn’t just how recent the event is (though that’s what’s measurable in this sort of dataset). It’s anything that makes certain events easier to recall. This is, for example, why some of our mistakes or surprise diagnoses can have an outside impact on our practice. We remember that unexpected PE we didn’t see coming more than the many more common examples of the negative CTA.

(Further reading on availability bias: Farnam Street.)

The Jargon of the Business Dark Arts

08.09.21 // Medicine

From Brian Alexander’s The Hospital: Life, Death, and Dollars in a Small American Town:

(Phil Ennen, one of the main characters, is the CEO of a struggling small-town community hospital in Bryan, Ohio.)

That was the world where Ennen and the vice presidents now found themselves as they listened to consultants they were auditioning to help create a strategic plan. “Transformational changes dictate that leaders within the physician enterprise focus on enterprise sustainability.” So they drove. They drove at “solutions.” The consultants offered entire suites of solutions. The solutions could be “leveraged” toward “accelerating the journey to risk capability.” There’d be “applied analytics” in “the Achieve solution set,” which was “purposely designed to assist physician enterprise leaders to align compensation models and strategic priorities, maximize productivity.” “The Achieve solution set not only drives current performance improvement but also establishes the forward-looking strategic, financial and operational structures to provide for the future risk capable physician enterprise.” Change was driven. Results were driven. Everything was “forward-looking” and “dynamic.” Zoom!

…

It wasn’t just about style. Ennen thought the world—and especially the world of medical care—was complicated enough without further obscuring meaning and understanding by spouting terms of the business dark arts. Such terms were deliberate obfuscations, thrown up as fortress walls to keep the uninitiated outside and throwing cash over the walls to the mysterious magicians inside so they’d shout down their wisdom. Now, though, like it or not (and he didn’t), Ennen and the others were knocking on the gates of the consultants.

What a great line by Alexander: “Such terms were deliberate obfuscations, thrown up as fortress walls to keep the uninitiated outside and throwing cash over the walls to the mysterious magicians inside so they’d shout down their wisdom.”

The book came out in March of this year and is a meticulous deep dive and narrative take of modern American healthcare through the lens of small-town America as a community hospital struggles to stay independent and survive.

Equity, Organized Medicine, and the Radiology Value Chain

07.26.21 // Medicine, Radiology

It’s often said that large organizations are difficult to steer and slow to change course, but that’s only part of why they sometimes act in seemingly inexplicable ways. There’s another more insidious reason, and that is conflicts of interest, not just within leadership but also in the changing demographics of the membership.

A passage from “Value Chain: Where Radiologists Should Put Their Focus in Threats Against Income” by Seth Hardy MD MBA in Applied Radiology:

So, while private/public equity firms can use leverage to amplify profits to the upside, leverage has an opposite effect when gross income is in decline. Any cuts to reimbursement would be truly devastating to these firms’ employees; since the debt holders get paid before the radiologists, the impact on employed radiologists’ salaries may be significant. As equity-employed radiologists make up a greater share of dues-paying members within organized medical societies, it is easy to understand why the proposed CMS cuts were characterized as draconian by those societies. But a clear understanding of value chain by physicians is increasingly critical to evaluate the rhetoric of our medical society leadership.

I am now a partner in a physician-owned independent radiology practice. A CMS paycut would mean that we earn commensurately less money—not that we will become insolvent.

That should count for something when choosing where to work.

Munger on Incorrect Approaches to Medicine

07.15.21 // Medicine

In 2003, Charlie Munger gave a lecture titled ‘Academic Economics: Strengths and Weaknesses, after Considering Interdisciplinary Needs,’ at the University of California at Santa Barbara.

It’s a pretty good read.

He mostly discusses problems with economics as a soft science that desperately wants to be a hard science.

Medicine is also surprisingly soft. I’ve replaced some words with medicine in several paragraphs to illustrate how cross-domain the problems with medical practice can be:

The Man with a Hammer Syndrome

Yet medicine, like much else in academia, is too insular.

The nature of this failure is that it creates what I always call, “man with a hammer syndrome.” And that’s taken from the folk saying: To the man with only a hammer, every problem looks pretty much like a nail. And that works marvelously to gum up all professions, and all departments of academia, and indeed most practical life. The only antidote for being an absolute klutz due to the presence of a man with a hammer syndrome is to have a full kit of tools. You don’t have just a hammer. You’ve got all the tools. And you’ve got to have one more trick.

This is an argument for a broad foundation in medicine before specialization. The more siloed we are, the less we can draw on different toolsets to help patients.

This is also an argument against fee-for-service. If doctors and hospitals can generate the most money with a certain hammer, that hammer is likely to be used disproportionately.

Overweighing what can be counted

A special version of this “man with a hammer syndrome” is terrible, not only in economics but practically everywhere else, including medicine. It’s really terrible in medicine. You’ve got a complex system and it spews out a lot of wonderful numbers that enable you to measure some factors. But there are other factors that are terribly important, [yet] there’s no precise numbering you can put to these factors. You know they’re important, but you don’t have the numbers. Well practically everybody (1) overweighs the stuff that can be numbered, because it yields to the statistical techniques they’re taught in academia, and (2) doesn’t mix in the hard-to-measure stuff that may be more important. That is a mistake I’ve tried all my life to avoid, and I have no regrets for having done that.

This gives rise to the classic Goodhart’s Law: when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.

We shouldn’t confuse measurability with importance. In many cases, the measure is a poor surrogate for what we really care about or can be gameable to ultimately negative downstream effects. An example? Patient satisfaction.

The first-order short-term focus

Too little attention in medicine to second-order and even higher-order effects. This defect is quite understandable, because the consequences have consequences, and the consequences of the consequences have consequences, and so on. It gets very complicated. When I was a meteorologist I found this stuff very irritating. And medicine makes meteorology look like a tea party.

…

Extreme economic ignorance was displayed when various experts, including Ph D. economists, forecast the cost of the original Medicare law. They did simple extrapolations of past costs. Well the cost forecast was off by a factor of more than 1000%. The cost they projected was less than 10% of the cost that happened. Once they put in place all these new incentives, the behavior changed in response to the incentives, and the numbers became quite different from their projection. And medicine invented new and expensive remedies, as it was sure to do. How could a great group of experts make such a silly forecast? Answer: They over simplified to get easy figures, like the rube rounding Pi to 3.2! They chose not to consider effects of effects on effects, and so on.

Short-term thinking is bad at both micro and macro levels.

On the micro level, the patient’s care doesn’t end when they leave the clinic or hospital. It keeps going throughout their life. And each episode of care from each different provider doesn’t exist in a vacuum. It interfaces with every other bit of care they get. The combination of direct patient care, socioeconomic factors, and education is a complicated mess at baseline.

But decisions lead to decisions, and outcomes further affect outcomes. We treat at the n of 1 and often at the timepoint of right this second. Missing the forest for the trees is easy to do when your patient is usually coming to you for a tree and you are also paid to look at the tree.

On the macro level, Munger’s Medicare example above. Or, the more recent news, approving a multibillion-dollar a-year Alzheimer’s drug with no evidence that it works: It won’t just cost billions of upfront, it will result in other companies diverting resources in a rush for me-too drugs that also may not work to get a slice of a massive market and likely cost still billions more while potentially resulting in less novel drug development. We think in linear terms but systems often work exponentially.

To STAT or not to STAT

07.01.21 // Medicine, Radiology

A passage about limited resources and optimizing imaging from The Emergency Mind: Wiring Your Brain for Performance Under Pressure by Dan Dworkis MD PhD:

Within the broader context of your responsibility however, there frequently will be significant variability in the relative urgencies of individuals being imaged. Some patients—like a person seemingly experiencing an acute stroke—do need to be scanned immediately. Others—such as a patient with abdominal pain, stable vitals, and a reassuring physical exam—while no less “deserving” of those resources, would receive nearly equal benefit from being scanned now as in an hour from now. Optimizing care across the field in this context would involve prioritizing CT scans for those patients who would receive outsized benefits from immediate imaging, even if this makes some other patients wait longer.

Put a different way: If everything is stat, nothing is stat.

Stat abuse is one of those crimes especially tempting to inpatient teams in busy hospitals. It’s natural to want answers (and dispo) as soon as possible, and we assume that we will get them faster if we increase the priority of the exam.

All a clinician knows is that sometimes something ordered routine takes forever and that ordering stat should generally result in it being performed faster. They may not even care if the read is prioritized in all cases so long as the patient is freed from the waiting and future transport.

It’s also human nature for there to be a distribution with certain individuals ordering an outsize proportion of “stat” exams. The negatives of over-ordering or inappropriate priority are almost always placed on other staff. In a zero-sum game, selfish behavior may be an optimal choice for individual success even if it makes the system less efficient overall. Hospitals very rarely scold their staff for such abuses.

I don’t think most clinicians even have any idea where along the spectrum their behavior falls. Knowledge of outlier performance one hopes might curb excesses, and that data would certainly be helpful for individuals to know (presuming those individuals are capable of feeling shame and said shame functions as a deterrent). Such information would have to be long-term and stratified well to be meaningful (we should expect different levels of stat exams as a fraction of orders from different hospital units, for example). Otherwise, data are dismissible.

Ultimately, pleading and punishment are often ineffective and/or undesirable.

A more helpful approach would include data to guide decision-making on a case by case basis:

The EMR should show in real-time the expected wait for different study types based on the current queue and exam types pending, both inpatient and outpatient (i.e. how many unnecessary exams are obtained during an inpatient stay due to fears of long delays for outpatient follow-up?). Yes, a routine study may unexpectedly get bumped further down the line, but a smart system would incorporate predictions based on the current patient census, admission diagnoses, time of year, and whatever else some machine learning algorithm would include its impenetrable black box of Skynet code.

It would be extremely helpful for all parties to know if an MRI should be expected today or tomorrow, sometime this afternoon or more likely at 3 am.

And so, yes, of course, people are working on this in the machine learning world. But hurry up. I for one will continue to welcome our AI overlords and their promised efficiency gains, but I’m still waiting.

The Lesser “Personal” Side of Medicine

06.24.21 // Medicine

A century-old tidbit of wisdom from the Book on the Physician Himself by DW Cathell MD (published way back in 1902, so ignore the pronouns):

EVERY Medical Man discovers sooner or later that The Practice of Medicine has two sides: A Greater Scientific Side, and a Lesser, but important, Personal Side, and that to fight the battles of life successfully it is as necessary for even the most scientific physician to possess a certain amount of professional tact and business sagacity as it is for a ship to have a rudder.

Only one of these sides is meaningfully taught or modeled in school, and I think we’ve all met physicians who do not seem to possess “professional tact” or “business sagacity” and been worse for it. Cathell was writing during a time when most physicians literally were one-man shops, but if anything the “lesser” side of the Practice of Medicine is more important than ever.

Discussing the ancient pro/cons of specialization that led to ever-increasing specialization over the next 120 years:

You may also ask the question: Shall I adopt a specialty? Would it pay me to do so? The adoption of a specialty, to the exclusion of other varieties of practice, is successful with but a few of those who attempt it. It should never be undertaken without first studying the whole profession and attaining a few years’ experience among the people as a general practitioner.

A successful specialist has many advantages over the hurly-burly life of the general practitioner: He is independent of general practice. He has short hours and is seldom or never called out at night. He can escape the expenses of horses, carriages, stables, and drivers. His Sundays are his own if he chooses. His fees are always good, sometimes fat. He can tell his terms and arrange about the payment of his fees at the beginning of each case, and usually gets them cash, and after a much easier life he generally dies a great deal better off pecuniarily than the general practitioner.

On the other hand, the specialist must be better equipped in instruments, etc., and more dextrous and masterful in their use and also more concise in the details of treatment; should possess a faultless manner and must foster his practice more carefully; in other words, if you put all your eggs in one special basket you must watch that basket much more closely.

So much energy has been spent fighting in the turf wars of watching and growing those special baskets that doctors dropped the ball on the broader healthcare basket entirely.

Dying rich after an easy life sounds nice, but he did miss the part where the physician became an employee and stopped being able to choose those short hours and Sundays “as his own.”

(Hat tip @archives_Rx.)

The Limitations of Copy and Paste

06.17.21 // Medicine, Miscellany

From “To Kickstart a New Behavior, Copy and Paste” by Kathy Milkman, author of the new book, How to Change, which suggests the best way to master a new skill is to emulate the methods of someone successful.

Happily, it’s easy to turn yourself into a deliberate copy-and-paster. The next time you’re falling short of a goal, look to high-achieving peers for answers. If you’d like to get more sleep, a well-rested friend with a similar lifestyle may be able to help. If you’d like to commute on public transit, don’t just look up the train schedules—talk to a neighbor who’s already abandoned her car. You’re likely to go further faster if you find the person who’s already achieving what you want to achieve and copy and paste their tactics than if you simply let social forces influence you through osmosis.

Kinda maybe sorta.

There is a big, big difference between emulating psychosocial habits (like vegetarianism or fashion) or noncomplex skills (like a workable commute route or some forms of regular exercise) and achieving success in a skill-based habit like practicing medicine or playing an instrument.

For low-stakes or low-commitment behaviors, sure. It’s reasonable to try to save time and give yourself the boost of something that has worked for someone. Copy-paste saves you from analysis paralysis.

But copy and paste is also a guaranteed way to fully embrace survivorship bias. You don’t know if the people you are emulating succeeded because of their methods or despite them. You don’t know if those methods are optimal for you or if the most important aspects of said methods are even those which are externally visible or consciously retrievable from the expert.

A lot of people don’t know why they’re successful, and their attempts to craft a narrative about their successes are fiction.

And when it comes to experts instead of peers, one of the common difficulties for many is that it’s been so long since they’ve been a novice that they literally don’t know what it’s like anymore. Their memories of their early growth are fuzzy and often out-of-date to boot.

As we are back in the middle of USMLE Step season for the medical students among you, I am reminded of this post I wrote in 2014 about the Methods to Success Fallacy.

Being “Backable” for Residency Interviews

06.08.21 // Medicine

After reading stories of match success and failure on social media this spring, I’m already thinking about another set of virtual interviews this fall and contemplating how applicants can shine.

Here are some takeaways from Backable: The Surprising Truth Behind What Makes People Take a Chance on You. While this book and its many examples mostly center on entrepreneurship and how startups can get money from investors, there are some nuggets that cross domains nicely. The interview is in some ways a pitch meeting where you’re selling yourself.

The power of unique perspectives and experience

[Investor Ben] Horowitz responded that great ideas typically stem from an “earned secret”—discovered by going out into the world and “learning something that not a lot of other people know.”

Everyone says the same things in personal statements, is drawn to their chosen fields for the same reasons, and has largely similar clinical experiences. When you have rare real-world experience—frankly in any context or domain—that makes you different.

Share how those insights have changed you and inform your approach to medicine.

Earned insights are rare

What’s the single best piece of advice that would help them succeed?” [Oscar-winning producer Brian] Grazer paused for a moment, then said, “Give me something that isn’t google-able. I want an idea that is based on a surprise insight. Not something I could find through a Google search.”

An idea that stems from hands-on experience is way more backable than the same exact idea if it simply originated sitting behind a desk. But the catch is, without being boastful, you have to make that effort shine through your pitch. It can’t be hidden.

Here’s an open secret: a few months of clinical experience don’t make you an expert in your chosen field just as even less time in other specialties doesn’t make you an expert in those either. Bringing fourth-year swagger to interviews often isn’t a great idea.

That said, real insights—whether about your specialty, health care, or even just being a human being and having a good attitude about showing up to work every day for your patients—are a breath of fresh air. I love when I can tell an applicant has an active mind and thoughtful approach, when I can really see their gears turning.

Why should someone be scared to miss out on you?

As creators, our job isn’t to use FOMO to manipulate backers, but rather to neutralize their fear of taking a bad bet. Though it may sound strange, FOMO can make a risky bet feel safe because it shields us from the risk of being left behind. This feeling of inevitability rarely comes from the argument that we should change the world, but rather from the argument that the world is already changing—with or without us.

If there’s a knock on your record and you’re scared people are going to pass you over, own it. The typical advice is to talk about what you learned after your failure, how you’ve changed, and other such bland platitudes, but the fact is that I expect anyone who has messed up to tell me they’ve grown.

That’s all fine. Go ahead and do that.

But…don’t just approach your candidacy from a position of weakness. What about you is unique or special? Why should a program director be scared to lose you? Why are you backable despite (or because of) that setback?

Connections are powerful

Salman Rushdie once wrote, “Most of what matters in our lives takes place in our absence.” While we’re present for the pitch, we’re most likely absent for the hallway huddles, backroom meetings, and email threads that decide the fate of our ideas. Backers become fierce advocates when they are on the inside of an idea. They crack their own egg and add it to the mix.

Stronger-than-average connections with your interviewer will cause people to go to bat for you in the post-interview huddle. So many interviews are bland Q&A. True connections are rare. If you can get an organic discussion going and the time flies, everybody wins.

Each interaction is an independent variable

We don’t typically win people over in one conversation, but through a series of interactions that builds trust and confidence. Even if the last conversation went poorly, you can use the next one to show them how they influenced your work. This type of follow-up is so powerful that it can often change a backer’s response from no to yes.

You can’t really do this with your interviewer (post-interview correspondence doesn’t carry that kind of power), but you can take each interview as a fresh start.  Don’t let one sour interaction spoil the day.

Interviewing is a skill that requires practice

We’ll spend hours researching, outlining, pulling together slides—but very little time practicing what we’re going to share. The feeling seems to be that if we have the right content and we know it well enough, then there’s no need for practice. But I’ve found that backable people tend to practice their pitch extensively before walking into the room. They practice with friends, family, and colleagues. They’re rehearsing on jogs with running partners, in the break room, and during happy hour. They prepare themselves for high-stakes pitches through lots of low-stakes practice sessions—what I now call exhibition matches.

You need to practice. The common approach is to do practice interviews, often with residents and faculty at your home institution (and potentially online organized on social media). You should do those things.

But I’d take it a step further.

You should talk to strangers. Practice having genuine interactions and conversations with people who don’t know you.  Practice really listening to your patients. Get to know them as the three-dimensional human beings they are.

The easy flow of conversation is a delight to interviewers.

You are a process, not an outcome

The other techniques in this book got me comfortable with content, but I still had to learn to get truly comfortable with myself. I had to learn to let go of my ego—to express, rather than impress.

So much of your identity feels tied to your success in school, the match, and your developing career as a physician. But internal validation is always superior to external validation. You don’t and can’t control outcomes. You—at best—control yourself and your approach.

You will enjoy and likely be more successful in the match process if you are content with yourself, happy to do your best, and try to find a good fit. We call it “practicing” medicine, but living life is also the practice of showing up each day working on being the version of ourselves that we strive to be.

When you receive an interview, your goal is not to impress your interviewers. It should be to express yourself and be open to others so that you can find the best place to live and grow in your practice.

Shallow versus Deep. Prolific versus Profound.

06.03.21 // Medicine, Reading

From Rest: Why You Get More Done When You Work Less:

We see work and rest as binaries. Even more problematic, we think of rest as simply the absence of work, not as something that stands on its own or has its own qualities. Rest is merely a negative space in a life defined by toil and ambition and accomplishment. When we define ourselves by our work, by our dedication and effectiveness and willingness to go the extra mile, then it’s easy to see rest as the negation of all those things. If your work is your self, when you cease to work, you cease to exist.

What fraction of doctors (and miscellaneous business workaholics) do you think still believe rest is for the weak and that the ability to slog and hustle is not just good but truly enviable?

Second, most scientists assumed that long hours were necessary to produce great work and that “an avalanche of lectures, articles, and books” would loosen some profound insight. This was one reason they willingly accepted a world of faster science: they believed it would make their own science better. But this was a style of work, Ramón y Cajal argued, that led to asking only shallow, easily answered questions rather than hard, fundamental ones. It created the appearance of profundity and feelings of productivity but did not lead to substantial discoveries. Choosing to be prolific, he contended, meant closing off the possibility of doing great work.

Just like many jobs are bullshit jobs, much of our research is bullshit research. If we reward volume, we disincentive depth.

As Vinay Prasad was quoted in the Atlantic, “Many papers serve no purpose, advance no agenda, may not be correct, make no sense, and are poorly read. But they are required for promotion.”

When we treat workaholics as heroes, we express a belief that labor rather than contemplation is the wellspring of great ideas and that the success of individuals and companies is a measure of their long hours.

And this is one of the tough parts about almost everything written about deep work, rest, the power of no, when to say yes, and everything else in the modern business/productivity/self-improvement genre. The approaches just don’t apply very well out-of-the-box to service workers.

Doctors are primarily service workers. If we work more hours, we see more patients. While there is almost certainly a diminishing return in terms of quality care, there is no diminishing return for billing. A doctor generates more RVUs when they have more clinical hours, and that means more profits for their handlers (until someone burns out and quits).

William Osler advised students that “four or five hours daily it is not much to ask” to devote to their studies, “but one day must tell another, one week certify another, one month bear witness to another of the same story.” A few hours haphazardly spent and giant bursts of effort were both equally fruitless; it was necessary to combine focus and routine. (He lived what he preached: one fellow student recalled that in his habits Osler was “more regular and systematic than words can say.”)

Cramming is bad. Overwork is bad. A reasonable concerted effort over a long period of time is good.

Studying 4-5 hours a day was apparently a reasonable amount to Osler’s sensibility. Olser, if you recall, founded the first residency training program at Johns Hopkins.

Do you remember when the heads of the NBME and FSMB suggested in 2019 that a pass/fail USMLE Step 1 would be bad because students might take the decreased pressure as an opportunity to watch Netflix? Because I do.

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